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This paper examines whether economic integration favors countries’ 
convergence into a common cone of diversification. We analyze the 
manufacturing specialization patterns for a sample of 19 current and 
potential European Union countries over the period 1963-1998, and 
assess the impact of integration on their evolution. We perform year-
by-year threshold estimations of Rybczynski relationships to identify 
the diversification cones and then estimate discrete choice models to 
investigate whether membership in the European Union is associated 
with a higher probability of being in a same cone. Economic integration 
in Europe is found to have promoted convergence from lower to higher 
diversification cones.  
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In the standard Heckscher-Ohlin trade model two global equilibria may result: a 
“single cone” of production in which all countries have the same mix of tradables and 
offer the same factor rewards; or “multiple cones” where countries specialize in a subset 
of industries most suited to their relative endowments and factor prices are not 
necessarily equalized. While much work has been done attempting to econometrically 
verify the single product mix equilibrium, empirical studies addressing the multiplicity 
of cones are scarce.  
In this paper, we treat the European Union as a Hecksher-Ohlin integrated world 
economy and examine whether members converge from lower to higher cones of 
diversification. In particular, we analyze the manufacturing specialization patterns for 19 
current and potential European Union countries over the period 1963-1998, assessing the 
impact of trade integration on their evolution. In doing this, we relate two strands of 
economic literature: empirical tests of the Heckscher-Ohlin trade model and economic 
integration and convergence. 
To our knowledge, only Debaere and Demiroglu (2003), Schott (2003), and Xiang 
(2004) have recently examined the multiple-cone question empirically. Debaere and 
Demiroglu (2003) use the lens conditions derived by Deardorff (1994) that compares 
country endowments with sectoral factor inputs. Considering a sample of 28 developed 
and developing countries for 1990, they find that, even though the endowments of 
countries are too dissimilar for all countries to be able to produce the same set of goods, 
rich OECD countries lie in the same diversification cone. Following Leamer (1984, 1987), 
Schott (2003) estimates Rybczynski relationships for a cross-section of 45 countries for the   2
same year via maximum likelihood. He reports that the null hypothesis of a single-cone 
equilibrium is rejected in favor of an alternative hypothesis of two cones after correcting 
for cross-country intra-industry heterogeneity. Furthermore, most developed economies 
seem to be within a common cone. These results are thus compatible to those in Debaere 
and Demiroglu (2003). Comparing countries’ distribution of capital-labor ratios over 
industries for 10 rich OECD countries on the basis of the Kolgomorov-Smirnov test 
statistics, i.e., non-parametric estimation techniques, Xiang (2004) uncovers, in turn, that 
there are non-uniform differences in the distribution functions of factor usage among 
these countries. In contrast to the two studies above, he identifies three diversification 
cones within the set of developed economies and shows that the United Kingdom, 
France, and the United States are in different groups. 
This paper first differs from the previous investigations in that we use a different 
empirical methodology. In order to identify the number of cones of diversification, we 
perform year-by-year threshold estimations of Rybczynski relationships as described in 
Hansen (2000). Second, instead of considering a unique cross-sectional sample, we look at 
the question of multiple cones of diversification in a multi-period framework, which 
allows us to trace both the evolution of the number of cones and the country composition 
within each cone over time.  
Having identified the path of the cross-sectional distribution of economies across 
different cones, we then go one step further in linking these developments to the process 
of economic integration. Venables (2003) has shown that trade agreements between high 
income countries are likely to cause a convergence of income and production structures. 
This theoretical result finds empirical support in Ben-David (1993, 1996). We contribute to 
this branch of the literature, providing additional evidence. We estimate discrete choice 
models to investigate whether membership in the European Union favors convergence of 
production patterns, i.e., whether this membership is associated with a higher probability 
of being in a same cone of diversification. Economic integration in Europe is found to   3
have generally promoted convergence from lower to higher diversification cones. The 
exceptions seem to be Greece and Portugal.  
Determining the existence of different cones is important for several reasons. 
Within a cone, definite predictions are generated about the factor content of trade and 
these have been tested (Bowen et al., 1987; Trefler, 1995; and Davis and Weinstein, 2001). 
The equalization of factor prices across countries and across regions has also been tested 
(Repetto and Ventura, 1997; Bernard and Schott, 2002; and Hanson and Slaughter, 2002). 
Integration of the world economy provides a force for income concentration such that the 
Stolper-Samuelson effect holds due to increased trade. Tests of this variety will be 
affected by the existence of multiple cones of product diversification and therefore 
whether countries lie in the same cone has significant implications for the link between 
trade and income inequality.  
Within a cone, factor prices equalize and there is a lack of incentive to exploit 
cross-country factor price differences via outsourcing. Thus, the existence of multiple as 
opposed to the traditional single cone of diversification affects the international 
fragmentation of production (Feenstra and Hanson, 1997; Deardorff, 1998). Whether 
countries belong to the same cone is also important for the relationship between trade 
and growth (Deardorff, 2001) and economic development (Ventura, 1997). 
In addition, establishing whether economic integration is a force for convergence 
or divergence is of interest because the way benefits and costs of trade arrangements are 
distributed between member countries plays a non-minor role in explaining their success 
or collapse (e.g., Venables, 1999). In the particular case of the European Union, promoting 
cohesion is a central concern explicitly expressed in the foundational Treaty of Rome 
(1957). Further, if as a result of declining trade barriers, integrating countries become 
more similar (dissimilar) in terms of their production structures, and thus less (more) 
sensitive to industry specific shocks, less (more) idiosyncratic business-cycles should be 
expected (e.g., Frankel and Rose, 1998). As it is well known, this is a key criterion in   4
delimiting an optimum currency area and thus of fundamental relevance in assessing the 
current European Monetary Union as well as its future extensions.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the 
theoretical framework. Section 3 briefly describes our dataset, while Section 4 explains 
the econometric methodology. Section 5 discusses the estimation results and Section 6 
concludes. 
 
2 Theory   
 
We begin with the multicone-version of the Heckscher-Ohlin model. In this 
world, each cone is a combination of input vectors. In the Lerner (1952) description of an 
open economy’s accumulation of capital relative to fixed supplies of labor, there are two 
factors (capital and labor) and four industries. The four industries, I1, I2, I3, and I4, have 
unit-value isoquants which define three cones of diversification. Output levels are a 
linear function of the factor supplies.1 The Lerner diagram, shown in Figure 1, illustrates 
that as capital is accumulated relative to labor, output in an industry evolves such that 
countries move into cones with progressively lower capital rental rates and higher wages. 
A GDP-maximizing country will produce two goods in the cone in which it resides. The 
capital-labor ratios mark the borders between the cones and are labeled i γ where i=[0,3]. 
Thus, within a cone, countries produce a similar set of goods. 
Countries abundant in capital produce the two capital-intensive goods while 
countries abundant in labor produce the two labor-intensive goods. As capital 
accumulates relative to labor, there is an evolution of output in industry i, in country c, 
per total workforce (qci=Qci/Lc) and the industry development path (à la Leamer, 1987) can 
                                                 
1 Without a loss of generality, in Figure 1, each sector is displayed as having Leontief technology and factor 
intensity reversals are ruled out.   5
be mapped. Hence, as countries accumulate capital, they move to higher cones and the 
mix of commodities they produce shifts to be increasingly capital-intensive.2 
The second issue we address in this paper is how this picture would change 
during a process of economic integration. We examine whether integration favors 
convergence of production structures and per capita income levels. In particular, we 
investigate whether membership in an economic agreement such as the European Union 
promotes convergence into a common cone of diversification. 
Let us assume that comparative advantage is associated with per capita income 
via physical capital endowments, so that higher capital-income ratios are linked to higher 
per capita incomes. Now consider two rich economies, i.e., both with capital-labor ratios 
above the world average. Venables (2003) shows that membership in an economic union 
comprised of these two economies will lead to convergence. The country with an 
“intermediate” comparative advantage will do better from the union than the one with 
“extreme” comparative advantage because the former is likely to benefit from trade 
creation, while the latter is likely to experience trade diversion. The European Union 
would therefore promote convergence along the development path, i.e., as countries 
accumulate capital relative to labor, in such a way as to end up being more similar. We 




We consider a sample of 19 European countries: Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Denmark, 
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, 
Poland, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, and the United Kingdom for which we have all 
the required data over a long time span. Some of these countries are founding members 
of the European Union, other countries became members during the 1970s, 1980s, and 
                                                 
2 We choose to follow the Leamer (1987) and Schott (2003) line of reasoning.   6
1990s and finally, the remaining ones only entered the union very recently or are still not 
members. Table 1 shows the evolution of EU country composition over the last four 
decades. The successive enlargements and thus the time varying membership provide us 
with a natural experiment to identify the impact of economic integration on 
specialization patterns. 
In particular, we use value-added data for these countries across 28, 3-digit ISIC 
Rev. 2 industries over the period 1963-1998 from the United Nations Industrial 
Development Organization (UNIDO) database. As discussed in Schott (2003), focusing on 
manufacturing precludes testing whether endowment disparities are associated with 
specialization across broad economic sectors (agriculture, mining, manufacturing, and 
services), but has the advantages of including fewer non-tradables than other sectors and 
thus being closer to the theoretical assumptions. 
We also use economy wide labor data, and arable, forest and woodland data 
from the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) as well as data on the skill level of 
working age population (i.e., population with at least complete secondary school) from 
the database prepared by Barro and Lee (2000) over the period 1960-2000. Finally, we 
apply the perpetual inventory method as indicated in Jacob et al. (1997) and Kamps 
(2004) with a depreciation rate of 13.3% (e.g., Schott, 2003) on gross fixed capital 
formation over the period 1970-2000 reported by the United Nation Commission for 
Trade and Development (UNCTAD).3 
 
4 Econometric  Methodology 
 
The econometric methodology consists of a two step procedure. First, to determine the 
number of cones and the distribution of countries across them, we take a route that is 
                                                 
3 In the presence of technological differences across countries, factor endowments should be adjusted by 
productivity (see Debaere and Demiroglu, 2003). We are currently working on deriving these adjusted 
endowments to check the robustness of our results. Similarly, we are aware of the problems that the intra-
industry heterogeneity originating in the ISIC aggregation could create (see Leamer, 1987, and Schott, 2003).   7
different from those pursued in previous empirical investigations. We assess the 
existence of multiple diversification cones using a threshold regression model as 
described in Hansen (2000). Since we have annual data for the period 1963-1998, we can 
establish whether the number of cones has changed over time as well as to identify how 
countries re-group across these cones. We then investigate whether the probability of 
being in a same cone is affected by common membership in the European Union using 
binary choice models, including an accounting of dynamics in a probit model for panel 
data with unobserved heterogeneity, as explained in Wooldridge (2005). 
We start by estimating the Rybczynski relationships for the cross-section of 19 
countries for which we have the required data for each of the sample years. Formally:  
cit ct t cit it it cit z k q ε θ θ θ + ′ + ′ + = − − 1 3 1 2 1    (1) 
where qcit=Qcit/Lct denotes output per worker in country c, in industry i, in year t; 
kcit-1=dikct-1 with di being a row vector of industry dummy variables and kct-1=Kct-1/Lct-1, 
country c ‘s capital-labor ratio in year t-1; and z is vector of country endowments per 
worker included to control for the presence of production factors other than labor and 
capital: arable land, forest and woodland, and skill per worker.4  
As discussed, economies shift out of labor-intensive manufacturing into capital-
intensive manufacturing at higher levels of capital abundance. Hence, in a multicone 
world the derivative of output, with respect to endowments, changes along the 
development path as countries accumulate capital relative to labor. The regression 
coefficients therefore change across cones (see Schott, 2003). To assess whether this 
threshold effect is present in our sample, we employ a heteroskedasticity-consistent 
Lagrange Multiplier (LM) test for a threshold as described in Hansen (1996). Since the 
threshold is not identified under the null hypothesis of no threshold effect, the p-values 
are computed by a bootstrap analog, fixing the regressors from the right-hand side of 
Equation (1) and generating the bootstrapped dependent variable from the distribution 
                                                 
4 We use one period-lagged explanatory variables to avoid simultaneity problems.   8
N( )
2 , 0 i ε , where i ε ˆ is the OLS residual from the estimated threshold model. Let us rewrite 
Equation (1) in the following way: 
cit ct t cit x q ε θ + ′ = −1    (2) 
where x is a vector including all endowments per worker. If we find evidence in 
favor of two diversification cones, the correct specification is the following:  
( ) cit ct n t ct t cit x x q ε γ δ θ + ′ + ′ = − − 1 1    (3) 
where  n=CxI=532 (number of countries times number of industries), 
() () γ γ 1 1 1 − − − = ct ct ct d x x  with the indicator function  ( ) { } γ γ ≤ = − − 1 1 ct ct k d , so that the continuously 
distributed capital-labor ratio k=K/L acts as a threshold variable, i.e., a variable that is 
used to split the sample into two groups. Let ( ) γ γ x x = . In matrix notation, we therefore 
have: 
ε δ θ γ + + = X X Qt    (4) 
  where we have suppressed the time index t to simplify the notation. To estimate 
our parameter of interest, namelyγ , we follow the method proposed by Hansen (2000). 
This method consists of obtaining least squares estimates of the regression parameters 
( ) γ δ θ , , n  through concentration. Formally, let  
() () ( ) δ θ δ θ γ δ θ γ γ X X Q X X Q S − − ′ − − = , ,    (5) 
  be the sum of squared errors function. By definition, the least squares estimators 
( ) γ δ θ ˆ , ˆ , ˆ  jointly minimize Equation (5). For this minimization,γ  is assumed to be restricted 
to a bounded set[ ] Γ = γ γ, .5 Conditional onγ , Equation (4) is linear inθ andδ . Thus, 
regressing Q on  [ ] γ γ X X X =
*  we get the conditional OLS estimators  () γ θˆ  and () γ δˆ . Let 
() γ n S be the concentrated sum of squared errors function:  
() () () () ( ) Q X X X X Q Q Q S S n n
* 1 * * * , ˆ , ˆ ′ − ′ ′ − ′ = = γ γ γ γ γ γ δ γ θ γ    (6) 
  
                                                 
5 The least squares estimator is also the maximum likelihood estimator when  ) , 0 (
2 σ ε N iid is ci .   9
γˆ can then be obtained as the value that minimizes this function: 




= ˆ   (7) 
where  {} n n k k ,..., 1 1 ∩ Γ = Γ  requires less than n  function evaluations. Asymptotic 
confidence intervals are obtained by inverting the likelihood ratio statistics (see Hansen, 
2000). The existence of additional breaks is evaluated by successively applying the same 
procedure on the sub-samples defined as indicated above. Once the thresholds have been 
identified, we group the countries into different diversification cones.  
The second stage is to determine whether membership in the European Union 
favors convergence into a common cone of diversification. In particular, we test whether 
country pairs such that both are members of the European Union have a higher 
probability of being in a same cone than country pairs that are not.  
Formally, we begin with a baseline specification given by the standard probit 
model: 
() ( ) it it it eu eu sc P ρ δ + Φ = = | 1   (8) 
() ( ) it t it it eu eu sc P ρ η + Φ = = | 1   (9) 
 where  Φ is the standard normal cumulative distribution function, sc is a dummy 
variable that takes the value of 1 if both countries belong to the same diversification cone 
and 0 otherwise, eu is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if both countries are 
members of the European Union and 0 otherwise, and t η are unrestricted years intercepts. 
Since there are no exact priors about the timing of the impact of EU membership, we also 
consider up to four lags for eu. 
We then estimate a random effects probit model to account for unobserved 
heterogeneity: 
() ( ) it i it it eu eu sc P ρ µ δ + + Φ = = | 1   (10) 
  Finally, since the splitting up of countries displays inertia, we explicitly 
incorporate dynamics into the model following the approach proposed by Wooldridge   10
(2005). In particular, this approach consists of modeling the distribution of the 
unobserved effect conditional on the initial value and any exogenous explanatory 
variable and then performing conditional maximum likelihood estimation. We therefore 
estimate the following model: 
() ( ) i it it t i iT ii i it it sc eu eu eu sc sc sc P µ π ρ τ µ + + + Φ = = − − 1 1 0 1 , ,..., , ,.., | 1   (11) 
  where t=1,…,T and 1 corresponds to 1964 and T corresponds to 1998. Since we 
have an unbalanced panel for the whole sample period and this methodology is basically 
appropriate for balanced panels, we replicate the exercise for the period for which we 
have for all country pairs in all years: 1967-1993.6 The initial period, t=0, is 1963 (1966). 
The unobserved effect
i µ  is assumed to satisfy  ( )
2
2 0 1 0 0 , ~ , | υ σ α α α µ i i i i i eu sc N eu sc + +  where 
[] iT i i eu eu eu ,..., 1 =  is a row vector of indicators of EU membership in all time periods, 
which are included to allow for partial correlation between the unobserved effect and EU 
membership in all years.7 The
t τ are time effects for the enlargement years: 1973, 1981, 
1986, and 1995. We further consider the effect of lagged EU membership, in which case 
the model specification is as follows: 
() ( ) i it it t i iT ii i i it it sc eu eu eu eu sc sc sc P µ ϕ ρ τ µ + + + Φ = = − − − 1 1 1 0 0 1 , ,..., , , ,.., | 1   (12) 




The first step of our empirical analysis consists of determining the number of 
diversification cones and of classifying the countries into the resulting groups. This is 
done using the sample splitting method proposed by Hansen (2000) as described above. 
                                                 
6 This method assumes that the explanatory variables, in this case mainly eu, are strictly exogenous, which rules 
out feedback from unexpected movements in the outcome variable sc to future values of the explanatory 
variables. Since it might be argued that eu is endogenous we are working on the implementation of the GMM 
estimator proposed by Arellano and Carrasco (2003) to correct possible endogeneity biases. 
7 In particular, 
i µ is specified as follows: 
i i i i eu sc ν α α α µ + + + = 2 0 1 0 , where 
i i ν is independent of (sci0,eui) and 
distributed as  ( )
2 , 0 ν σ Normal . In this case, scit given ( ) i i i it eu sc sc ν , , ,..., 0 1 −  follows a probit model with response 
probability:  () i i i it it eu sc sc eu ν α α α π ρ + + + + + Φ − 2 0 1 0 1 .   11
Table 2 reports annual threshold estimations over the period 1963-1998. According to 
these estimates, three diversification cones can be identified from the beginning of the 
1960s to the end of the 1970s whereas there are essentially two cones in the last two 
decades.  
Table 2 allocates the sample countries into the different cones according to their 
capital-labor ratios. During the 1960s and 1970s the lower cone included Cyprus, Greece, 
Hungary, Poland, Portugal, and Turkey. Austria, Finland, Italy, and the United Kingdom 
belong to the middle cone, while Spain and Ireland alternated between the lower and the 
middle cones. Finally, the upper cone consisted of Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, 
Netherlands, Norway, and Sweden. In recent years, the middle cone vanishes. 
Specifically, we observe convergence of the countries in the middle cone to those in the 
upper cone. On the other hand, there is persistence in the lower cone, which is mainly 
integrated by two “latecomers” in the European Union, Greece and Portugal, and four 
countries that were not members by 1998: Cyprus, Hungary, Poland, and Turkey. 
The next step is to assess whether economic integration in Europe favors 
convergence in production structures. In particular, we explore whether the probability 
of two countries being in a same cone is higher when both are members of the European 
Union. Operatively, we estimate discrete choice models where the dependent variable is 
an indicator of a common diversification cone. Specifically, from the information 
provided by the classification reported before we construct the dummy variable, sc, that 
takes a value of 1 if both countries belong to the same diversification cone and 0 
otherwise and varies across all possible country pairs (19 x (18/2)=271) and over all 
sample years (1963 to 1998). The main independent variable, eu, is also an indicator of 
common membership in the European Union over time as shown in Table 1.   12
Table 4 presents probit estimates of Equations (8) and (9), i.e., with and without 
fixed time effects as well as comparable logit estimates.8 The main results are robust 
across specifications and estimation methods: two countries that are both members of the 
European Union have a significantly higher probability of being in the same 
diversification cone.  Since the impact of economic integration on specialization patterns 
can materialize with some lag and thus have varying intensities over time, we re-estimate 
Equation (8), this time allowing for up to a four year lag in the explanatory variable. The 
estimation periods are then successively redefined to ensure comparability. Estimation 
results are reported in Table 5. The estimated effect of membership in the European 
Union increases with the length of the lag, so that it seems to be increasing over time. 
Hence, the longer that countries share membership in this agreement, the more likely it is 
that both end up in the same diversification cone. 
We next turn to estimations making use of the panel structure of our data. We 
first estimate a random effects probit model for panel data, i.e., Equation (10). This allows 
us to control for unobserved heterogeneity across country pairs. We consider both 
contemporaneous and lagged common membership as explanatory variables and 
unbalanced as well as balanced panels. Estimates are shown in Table 6. They confirm our 
original findings.  
To account for the dynamic nature of the economic relationships under study 
and, in particular, for the fact that specialization patterns exhibit inertia, we estimate 
Equations (11) and (12).9 The estimated effect of membership is again highly significant. 
As expected, the coefficient on the indicator of same cone is very statistically significant 
and seems to be factually large. The same is also true for the initial value of this variable. 
                                                 
8 The main difference between the normal and logit distribution are in the tails. Generally, the coefficients of the 
logit model are larger than those of the probit model. The reason is that the variance of a variable with a logistic 
distribution is 3 /
2 π , while that of a variable with a standard normal distribution is 1. Amemiya (1981) suggest 
dividing the coefficients of the logit model by 1.6 to compare them with those of the probit one. In our case, 
estimated coefficients, using this division factor, are essentially the same. 
9 In an alternative specification, we also introduce a second lag of the dependent variable and accordingly 
modify the conditioning set as suggested in Wooldridge (2005). Estimations coincide with those reported here. 
Results of this alternative specification are not presented, but are available from the authors upon request.   13
This implies that there is substantial correlation between the unobserved heterogeneity 
and the initial condition (see Wooldridge, 2005). Finally, as suggested by the EU 
membership variables for the different sets of countries over time, the probability of 
being in a same cone is higher for those countries that have shared membership since 
1973 and for those that have been members since 1995. As can be inferred from Tables 1 
and 3, results for 1981 and 1986 are driven by Greece and Portugal. 
 
6 Concluding  Remarks 
 
This paper aims at assessing whether economic integration favors convergence or 
divergence of countries specialization patterns. Examining the case of the Europe Union, 
we pursue a two-stage empirical methodology. In the first phase, we estimate Rybczynski 
relationships using the threshold model proposed by Hansen (2000) to identify the 
number of cones and how countries split across them on a year-by-year basis. Once 
countries are classified, we turn to the use of discrete choice models in the second phase 
in order to explore whether economic integration in Europe has favored convergence into 
a common cone of diversification. The main conclusion is that European integration has 
indeed lead to convergence from lower to higher cones. This confirms theoretical results 
in Venables (2003) suggesting that agreements between developed countries are a force 
for convergence. 
If trade integration pushes towards convergence and all members eventually end 
up within the same diversification cone, there could be an implied effect on the decision 
to accept new members into the agreement. In particular, if the economic union desires to 
maintain production within several cones of diversification, when more recent members 
converge to pre-existing ones, an enlargement may be anticipated. Hence, this union 
would expand stepwise at discrete intervals as is in fact the case for the European Union.    14
Figure 1 
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1958 Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands
1973 Denmark, Ireland, United Kingdom
1981 Greece
1986 Portugal, Spain
1995 Austria, Finland, Sweden
Source: Based on Baldwin (1994) and the European Union (2005)





























1963 K/L 5.480 8.870 1981 K/L 11.200
LM-Test 101.275 83.101 LM-Test 106.026
B. P-Value (0.000) (0.007) B. P-Value (0.000)
1964 K/L 5.430 8.880 1982 K/L 11.740
LM-Test 100.821 84.473 LM-Test 97.522
B. P-Value (0.000) (0.000) B. P-Value (0.000)
1965 K/L 5.380 8.900 1983 K/L 12.060 28.220
LM-Test 99.173 82.587 LM-Test 89.767 72.595
B. P-Value (0.000) (0.008) B. P-Value (0.000) (0.078)
1966 K/L 5.340 8.930 1984 K/L 12.160 31.280
LM-Test 100.538 82.510 LM-Test 86.294 1214.930
B. P-Value (0.000) (0.003) B. P-Value (0.004) (0.010)
1967 K/L 5.300 8.960 1985 K/L 12.030
LM-Test 99.727 79.610 LM-Test 84.263
B. P-Value (0.000) (0.023) B. P-Value (0.005)
1968 K/L 5.360 9.010 1986 K/L 12.160
LM-Test 91.591 96.640 LM-Test 85.908
B. P-Value (0.000) (0.000) B. P-Value (0.005)
1969 K/L 5.370 9.060 1987 K/L 15.970
LM-Test 96.557 94.506 LM-Test 89.046
B. P-Value (0.000) (0.000) B. P-Value (0.001)
1970 K/L 5.400 9.100 1988 K/L 13.760
LM-Test 107.496 96.590 LM-Test 86.854
B. P-Value (0.000) (0.000) B. P-Value (0.006)
1971 K/L 5.390 9.140 1989 K/L 15.150
LM-Test 111.383 81.501 LM-Test 90.860
B. P-Value (0.000) (0.006) B. P-Value (0.004)
1972 K/L 5.420 9.340 1990 K/L 23.040
LM-Test 102.284 77.117 LM-Test 100.178
B. P-Value (0.000) (0.041) B. P-Value (0.000)
1973 K/L 5.700 9.770 1991 K/L 18.700
LM-Test 99.307 76.313 LM-Test 93.515
B. P-Value (0.000) (0.033) B. P-Value (0.000)
1974 K/L 5.920 10.760 1992 K/L 20.160
LM-Test 104.653 73.343 LM-Test 89.410
B. P-Value (0.000) (0.078) B. P-Value (0.001)
1975 K/L 7.020 12.340 1993 K/L 22.300
LM-Test 103.181 77.961 LM-Test 80.054
B. P-Value (0.000) (0.024) B. P-Value (0.032)
1976 K/L 7.660 14.670 1994 K/L
LM-Test 103.663 77.624 LM-Test
B. P-Value (0.000) (0.041) B. P-Value
1977 K/L 8.280 17.240 1995 K/L
LM-Test 104.822 76.682 LM-Test
B. P-Value (0.000) (0.054) B. P-Value
1978 K/L 9.110 18.700 1996 K/L
LM-Test 117.508 78.735 LM-Test
B. P-Value (0.000) (0.025) B. P-Value
1979 K/L 10.700 1997 K/L
LM-Test 120.519 LM-Test
B. P-Value (0.000) B. P-Value
1980 K/L 10.060 1998 K/L 41.620
LM-Test 108.053 LM-Test 83.686
B. P-Value (0.000) B. P-Value (0.015)
The above table reports the levels of capital-labor ratios at which a threshold effect is detected as well as the LM-test
for no threshold with its associated p-bootstrapped value as calculated according to the method proposed by Hansen (2000).
Threshold Estimation




























Cone 1 Cone 2 Cone 3
1963-1966
Cyprus, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, 
Poland, Portugal, Spain, Turkey
Austria, Finland, United Kingdom 
Belgium, Denmark, France, 
Germany, Netherlands, Norway, 
Sweden
1967
Cyprus, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, 
Poland, Portugal, Turkey
Austria, Finland, Italy, Spain, United 
Kingdom 
Belgium, Denmark, France, 
Germany, Netherlands, Norway, 
Sweden
1968-1970
Cyprus, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, 
Poland, Portugal, Spain, Turkey
Austria, Finland, Italy, United 
Kingdom 
Belgium, Denmark, France, 
Germany, Netherlands, Norway, 
Sweden
1971-1973
Cyprus, Greece, Hungary, Poland, 
Portugal, Spain, Turkey
Austria, Finland, Ireland, Italy, 
United Kingdom 
Belgium, Denmark, France, 
Germany, Netherlands, Norway, 
Sweden
1974
Cyprus, Greece, Hungary, Poland, 
Portugal, Turkey
Austria, Finland, Ireland, Italy, Spain,
United Kingdom 
Belgium, Denmark, France, 
Germany, Netherlands, Norway, 
Sweden
1975-1976
Cyprus, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, 
Poland, Portugal, Turkey
Austria, Finland, Italy, Spain, United 
Kingdom 
Belgium, Denmark, France, 
Germany, Netherlands, Norway, 
Sweden
1977-1978
Cyprus, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, 
Poland, Portugal, Turkey
Austria, Finland, Germany, Italy, 
Spain, United Kingdom 
Belgium, Denmark, France, 
Netherlands, Norway, Sweden
1979
Cyprus, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, 
Poland, Portugal, Turkey
Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, 
France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, 
Norway, Spain, Sweden, United 
Kingdom 
1980-1982
Cyprus, Greece, Hungary, Poland, 
Portugal, Turkey
Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, 
France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, 
Netherlands, Norway, Spain, 
Sweden, United Kingdom 
1983
Cyprus, Greece, Hungary, Poland, 
Portugal, Turkey
Austria, Denmark, Finland, Ireland, 
Italy, Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, 
United Kingdom 
Belgium, France, Germany, Norway
1984
Cyprus, Greece, Hungary, Poland, 
Portugal, Turkey
Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, 
France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, 




Cyprus, Greece, Hungary, Poland, 
Portugal, Turkey
Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, 
France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, 
Netherlands, Norway, Spain, 
Sweden, United Kingdom 
1987
Cyprus, Greece, Hungary, Poland, 
Portugal, Spain, Turkey
Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, 
France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, 
Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, 
United Kingdom 
1988-1989
Cyprus, Greece, Hungary, Poland, 
Portugal, Turkey
Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, 
France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, 
Netherlands, Norway, Spain, 
Sweden, United Kingdom 
1990
Cyprus, Greece, Hungary, Poland, 
Portugal, Spain, Turkey
Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, 
France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, 
Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, 
United Kingdom 
1991-1993
Cyprus, Greece, Hungary, Poland, 
Portugal, Turkey
Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, 
France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, 
Netherlands, Norway, Spain, 
Sweden, United Kingdom 
1994-1997
Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Denmark, 
Finland, France (*), Greece, Hungary, 
Ireland, Italy(**), Netherlands, 
Norway, Poland, Portugal, Spain, 
Sweden, Turkey, United Kingdom 
1998
Cyprus, Greece, Hungary, Poland, 
Spain, Turkey
Austria, Denmark, Finland, 
Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, 
United Kingdom
The classification of countries in specialization cones is derived from threshold estimations 
performed using the method proposed by Hansen (2000).
(*) Data until 1996
(**) Data until 1994

















SC SC SC SC
EU 0.754*** 0.629*** 1.215*** 1.007***
(0.042) (0.044) (0.070) (0.073)
Observations 5852 5852 5852 5852
Time Effects No Yes No Yes
Log pseudo Likelihood -3881.995 -3566.468 -3881.995 -3569.630
Pseudo R
2
0.040 0.118 0.040 0.118
Probit and Logit estimates of Equations (8) and (9).
The sample period is 1963-1998.
The dependent variable (SC) is a dummy variable taking a value of 1 if both countries 
are in the same diversification cone and 0 otherwise.
The explanatory variable (EU) is a dummy variable taking a value of 1 if both countries 
are members of the EU.
Robust standard errors are in parentheses
Diversification Cones and EU Membership 



















SC SC SC SC SC SC SC SC SC
EU 0.754*** 0.741*** 0.728*** 0.715*** 0.700***









Observations 5852 5699 5699 5546 5546 5393 5393 5240 5240
Log pseudo Likelihood -3881.994 -3785.434 -3790.550 -3688.660 -3690.323 -3591.652 -3592.349 -3494.387 -3481.008
Pseudo R
2
0.040 0.040 0.038 0.039 0.039 0.038 0.038 0.037 0.041
Probit estimates of Equation (8).
The dependent variable (SC) is a dummy variable taking a value of 1 if both countries are in the same
diversification cone and 0 otherwise.
The explanatory variable (EU) is a dummy variable taking a value of 1 if both countries are members of the EU
(contemporaneous and lagged up to 4 periods, EU up to EU(-4), respectively).
Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
Diversification Cones and EU Membership - Contemporaneous and Lagged Effects


















SC SC SC SC SC SC SC SC
SC(-1) 2.540*** 2.538*** 2.246*** 2.242***
(0.061) (0.061) (0.088) (0.090)
SC(0) 0.822*** 0.823*** 1.738*** 1.742***
(0.069) (0.069) (0.247) (0.247)
EU 1.298*** 1.134*** 0.468*** 0.348**
(0.062) (0.081) (0.108) (0.141)
EU(-1) 1.535*** 0.846*** 0.480*** 0.380***
(0.071) (0.060) (0.108) (1.409)
EU(0) -0.330 -0.345 -0.853*** -0.876**
(0.213) (0.214) (0.404) (0.405)
EU(1973) 0.803*** 0.802*** 2.250*** 2.241***
(0.180) (0.180) (0.514) (0.513)
EU(1981) -0.456*** -0.461*** -1.484*** -1.486***
(0.173) (0.173) (0.495) (0.494)
EU(1986) -0.574*** -0.565*** -0.953*** -0.954***
(0.106) (0.105) (0.219) (0.218)
EU(1995) 0.480*** 0.480*** 1.160*** 1.164***
(0.074) (0.074) (0.192) (0.192)
Observations 5699 5699 4617 4617 5196 5196 4131 4131
Log pseudo Likelihood -2287.987 -2250.220 -1545.320 -1565.978 -1177.446 -1176.957 -811.848 -811.223
Estimates of Equations (10)-(12), i.e., static and dynamic Probit panels.
The dynamics panel specification follows that suggested by Wooldridge (2005).
The dependent variable (SC) is a dummy variable taking a value of 1 if both countries are in the same
diversification cone and 0 otherwise.
SC(-1): One-period lagged/SC(0): Initial period.
The explanatory variable EU is a dummy variable taking a value of 1 if both countries are members of the EU
(contemporaneous and lagged up to 4 periods).
EU(-1): One-period lagged/EU(0): Initial period.
EU (year) is a dummy variable taking a value of 1 if both countries are simultaneously members for the first 
time in that year.
The estimations include year-fixed effects for enlargement years (1973,1981,1986, and 1995) which are not reported.
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